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Abstract:
Contingent Protection has grown to become an important trade restricting device. In the
European Union, protection instruments like antidumping are used extensively. This paper
analyses whether macroeconomic pressures may contribute to explain the variations in the
intensity of antidumping protectionism in the EU. The empirical analysis uses count data
models, applying various specification tests to derive the most appropriate specification. Our
results suggest that the filing activity is inversely related to the macroeconomic conditions.
Moreover, they confirm existing evidence for the US suggesting that domestic
macroeconomic pressures are a more important determinant of contingent protection policy
than external pressures.
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I. Introduction
Contingent protection (CP) measures are GATT legal tools of protection. The most important
instruments of contingent protection are safeguard measures (article XIX GATT-1994) as
well as anti-dumping (AD) measures and countervailing (CV) measures, both based on article
VI GATT-1994. According to Finger (1993), the GATT recorded more than 2000 CP cases
during the 1980s, mostly initiated by the United States, the EU
1, Canada and Australia. More
recently, contingent protection has evolved into a global phenomenon as more and more
transition and developing countries established CP-laws and started to make use of these
(Miranda and Torres, 1997).
The growing importance of contingent protection raises the question of its determinants.
According to the GATT rules, actions are contingent on industry-specific circumstances:
safeguard actions can only be adopted if an increase in imports has caused (or threatens to
cause) serious injury to the domestic industry. In case of AD or CV actions, the importing
country must demonstrate that imports are dumped and consequently materially injure the
domestic industry. Therefore, most studies have adopted an industry-specific perspective to
explain the use of contingent protection, while only few studies have investigated whether
contingent protection actions may be related to macroeconomic conditions.
2
This paper is the first to analyse the macroeconomic determinants of contingent protection
policy for the European Union
3. Unlike previous studies for the US, who have mostly relied
on OLS estimation techniques, count data models are employed in order to account for the
discrete and non-negative nature of the data generating process. Various specification tests are
conducted to derive the most appropriate specification. The plan of the paper is as follows:
Section II briefly describes the institutional set up and selected stylised facts of contingent
protection in the EU. Section III reviews the relevant literature. In Section IV, we present and
discuss the model and our empirical findings. Section V concludes.
                                               
1  Although the three European Communities (EC, ECSC and EAEC) technically still exist, and the
European Union as such does not have a legal personality, throughout this paper, the term European
Union or EU shall be used to denote the Communities.
2  For a discussion of the industry-specific studies, see Tharakan (1995).
3  The analysis is done for the period 1980-98. The year 1980 is the first year covered by an annual report
of the Commission of the European Communities on the Community’s antidumping and antisubsidy
activities.4
II. Contingent Protection Policy in the European Communities: Institutional Set Up and
Stylised Facts
In the EU, the bulk of contingent protection policy falls on the instrument of antidumping.
Between 1980 and 1998, antidumping cases accounted for almost 95 percent of all European
contingent protection cases. 669 antidumping cases were launched as opposed to only 19 (10)
countervailing (escape clause) investigations
4. Hence, the contingent protection policy in the
EU is predominantly an antidumping policy.
AD-measures serve to protect domestic firms from “unfair” foreign import competition.
According to European AD-legislation
5, which is in accordance with the WTO AD-
agreement, dumping is usually defined as international price discrimination, i.e. dumping is
given, if the import price is below the domestic market price of a certain “like” product.
European trade legislation allows to impose AD duties on imports if the European AD
authority, the European Commission, proves that dumping has occurred and has caused injury
to the domestic industry. Alternatively, in case of an affirmative dumping and injury finding,
the Commission also has the right to terminate proceedings by undertakings: in this case, the
exporters “voluntarily” increase their prices to an extent which removes the injurious effects
of dumping.
AD investigations are requested by the domestic industry. The Commission decides whether a
formal complaint contains sufficient prima facie evidence justifying the initiation of an
investigation. During 1980-1998, this has been the case in – on average - 36 cases per year,
which reflects presumably both: firms that are active in filing complaints as well as an AD
authority who accepts the complaints leniently.
6 Approximately two thirds of these cases end
with affirmative dumping and injury findings (Vandenbussche, Konings and Springael, 1999).
Hence, once a case has been opened, domestic firms face a high probability of obtaining
protection via AD duties or undertakings. Moreover, theoretical (Prusa, 1992; Panagariya
and Gupta, 1998) and empirical work (Messerlin, 1989; Staiger and Wolak, 1994) has found
that imports may fall even if no dumping and injury is found, since cases are frequently
                                               
4  See Annual Reports of the European Commission to the European Parliament, various issues.
5  Since 1979, there have been five different antidumping regulations (Regulation No. 1681/79, 2176/84;
2423/88, 3283/94; 394/96. The following description holds for all of these regulations.
6  The Commission withholds information on this pre-investigation stage. The number of complaints
rejected by the Commission on grounds of missing evidence for dumping is thus not available.5
withdrawn by the complainants as a reaction to an out-of-court settlement between the
domestic industry and the accused exporters. In this settlement the foreign competitors
commit themselves to increase prices and reduce exports. Because of such investigation or
withdrawal effects, the number of investigations initiated each year is usually regarded to be a
better proxy for the protective effect than the number of cases that end with affirmative
decisions on injurious dumping (see e.g. Leidy, 1997). In the EU, the case activity per year is
subject to considerable variation: The number of newly initiated cases frequently jumps after
an external shock before protectionist pressure gradually declines in the subsequent periods.
In some years, the case activity was relatively low, i.e. below 25 cases per year, while in
others, it increased to more than 50 or - as most recently (1999) - to 86 cases.
III. Macroeconomic Determinants of Contingent Protection
The observed variations in the case activity of EU antidumping policy may be related to
macroeconomic determinants. Hereby, two different channels can be distinguished: First, the
balance of payment situation may have an impact on the willingness to accept a complaint if
the national policy makers pressure the Commission to use trade protection as a tool of
expenditure switching. According to this external pressure hypothesis, the number of
antidumping cases per year is therefore positively related to a widening in the trade balance
deficit or to a real appreciation of the domestic currency.
7
Second, the domestic macroeconomic situation may influence the filing activity of domestic
firms: if the domestic macroeconomic activity is sluggish, and unemployment relatively high,
any further increase in import competition puts downward pressure on each worker’s wage in
case he is dismissed. This tends to increase lobbying efforts by unions. Additionally, rent
seekers may anticipate that the governments are sensitive to any further increase in imports
which threaten to cause layoffs. According to this domestic pressure hypothesis, rent seeking
pressures increase in recessions and vent by dumping complaints.
                                               
7  Exchange rate swings may also matter in antidumping cases by inducing pricing-to-market behaviour
(Feinberg, 1989). Pricing to market occurs when firms do not pass through nominal exchange rate
swings into their export prices. When the exporting country’s currency is appreciating, WTO rules
induce the AD-authority to interpret pricing-to-market by foreign firms as dumping, since foreign
export prices expressed in foreign currency are then lower than in their domestic markets.6
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a  Concentrating on the proxies for domestic and external pressure.
Existing empirical evidence, focussing on the US experience, has confirmed that
macroeconomic pressure has an influence on the course of contingent protection policy over
time (see table 1). Hereby, all studies find that the case activity is related to internal pressure
variables approximated by changes in the rate of capacity utilisation and/or the unemployment7
rate as well as in the level of GNP
8. The studies however differ in their evaluation of whether
external pressure matters or not: evidence in favour of the external pressure hypothesis was
provided by Takacs (1981) and Coughlin, Terza and Khalifah (1987), while evidence
indicating their unimportance follows from the work of  Feigenbaum and Willet (1985),
Salvatore (1987) and Leidy (1997). Regarding the estimation tools employed in the different
studies, they in most part relied on conventional OLS regression techniques. However, as
mentioned in the introduction and further explained below, while they might provide a
reasonable approximation for large counts, they cannot capture the discrete and non-negative
nature of count data. Coughlin, Terza and Khalifah (1987) ran their regressions using a
Poisson, i.e. a count model, a Box Cox and an OLS specification, showing that the Poisson
specification dominates the other two. For these reasons, we employed various count data
specifications for our analysis.
IV. Empirical Results
1. Model Specification
In order to analyze macroeconomic influences on the pressure for antidumping protection, we
use the following econometric model:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 1   , 1   , 1   , 1 - - - - = t NUMBERNEW t IPJAPGR t EM t IM f t NUMBERNEW (1),
t=1,...,T, where NUMBERNEW(t) denotes the number of newly initiated AD and CV
investigations per year t, IM(t-1) are internal macroeconomic pressures, EM(t-1) external
macroeconomic pressures, and IPJAPGR(t-1) is the growth rate of total industrial production
in Japan, all in year t-1.
In line with previous studies, our dependent variable is the number of investigations initiated
per year (NUMBERNEW) rather than of those cases ending with affirmative decisions on
dumping as the adequate measure for the intensity of contingent protectionist pressures. This
is because of the investigation effect described in section II. Note once more that high values
                                               
8  The latter is used by Takacs (1981) and Salvatore (1987). In a comment to Takacs’ study, Feigenbaum,
Ortiz and Willet (1985) rightly criticize using the level as a proxy for the cyclical condititon. Rather, the
growth rate would serve as an appropriate proxy. Among others, we use the growth rate of real GDP in
our study.8
of the dependent variable may imply either a relatively lenient willingness to accept
complaints by the Commission and/or a pronounced filing activity of the domestic industry in
a given year. Regarding the independent variables, similar to studies for the US, factors
exerting domestic or external macroeconomic pressure are distinguished between. Domestic
macroeconomic pressure is approximated by the growth rate of real GDP (GDPGR(t-1)) and
by that of the total industrial production (IPGR(t-1)) as well as the percentage change in the
unemployment rate (UER(t-1)). We expect the coefficients of GDPGR(t-1) and of IPGR(t-1)
to be negative and that of UER(t-1) to be positive. Indicators of external pressure are the real
effective exchange rate (REER(t-1)), the trade balance (TB(t-1)), and the ratio of import
penetration (IMPPEN(t-1), percentage change from previous period). Under the external
pressure hypothesis, the coefficients of REER(t-1) and of TB(t-1) should be negative
9, while
that of IMPPEN(t-1) should be positive. The variables and their description are summarized
in table 2.
The growth rate of total industrial production in Japan (IPJAPGR(t-1)) was also included in
the regressions as a proxy of the macroeconomic situation of the EU’s trading partners. An
economic downturn of a major trading partner may have an effect on the number of petitions
filed either for reasons independent of the domestic macroeconomic conditions
10 or for those
related to the balance of payments. In particular, in a recession, the exporter’s domestic (here:
the Japanese) markets absorb a considerably smaller share of supply, ceteris paribus
increasing the export volume, i.e. the import competition faced by the trading partner (here:
the EU) and hence, other things equal, increasing the trading partner’s industries‘ demand for
protection. Thus, theory suggests that IPJAPGR(t-1) should enter the regressions with a
negative sign. The Japanese growth rate of total industrial production was chosen as a proxy
for these outside influences as it was the most important target of European AD-policy during
the investigation period, if measured by the trade volume affected. By the end of 1996,
approximately one third of the total trade affected by AD-measures referred to imports from
Japan.
11
                                               
9 The real effective exchange rate is defined so that an increase represents an improvement in the
international competitive position.
10 For an elaboration of this idea see Leidy (1997).
11 The number of cases initiated against Japanese firms during the period of investigation was 42.9
Table 2: Dependent and Independent Variables used in the Regressions
Abbreviation Description
Dependent variable
NUMBERNEW(t) Total number of newly initiated antidumping and antisubsidy cases per period
Independent variables
Macroeconomic activity:
GDPGR(t-1) Growth rate of real gross domestic product per period
IPGR(t-1) Growth rate of total industrial production per period
UER(t-1) Unemployment rate per period (percentage change from previous period)
International trade position:
REER(t-1) Real effective exchange rate per period
TB(t-1) Trade balance per period
IMPPEN(t-1) Import penetration per period (= Imports/GDP, percentage change from previous
period)
Further control variables:
IPGRJAP(t-1) Growth rate of total industrial production in Japan per period
NUMBERNEW(t-1) Total number of newly initiated antidumping and antisubsidy cases per period
(lagged dependent variable)
Note: The independent variables were lagged one period in order to account for the lagged effects of the
variables on the economy and in order to avoid the possibility of reverse causation.
The lagged dependent variable NUMBERNEW(t-1) was included in order to model potential
dependencies across time periods. A significantly negative sign would suggest a ‚depletion
effect‘ à la Leidy (1997): the higher the number of petitions is in a year t, the more the stock
of potential petitions in the following year t+1 is depleted. According to Leidy, the depletion
effect indicates the "safety value" nature of AD petitions. In case of macroeconomic
downturns, protectionist pressure intensifies and is vented by AD petitions, which in turn,
implies reduced demand for protection in the subsequent period. Hence, ceteris paribus, less
petitions should be filed and also the acceptance rate of petitions in year t+1 may depend
negatively on the number of cases opened in the preceding year.
12
                                               
12 Leidy (1997) suggests that this is due to the stock of petitioners being finite and the petitions remaining
under consideration during the following year.10
Finally, it was attempted to account for the introduction of the new antidumping regulation in
the EU that came into force following the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements
in 1995. In order to control for a possible “regime change” in European AD policy, a dummy
variable was added equalling one for the years 1995-1998 and zero for the years before.
2. Specification Analysis
Due to the discrete and non-negative nature of the dependent variable NUMBERNEW, the
normal linear regression model cannot constitute a valid data generating process. Rather, the
formally correct way is to use a count data model, whose distributional assumptions account
for the heteroscedastic and skewed distribution inherent to non-negative data and their
discreteness. However, for large counts - like our dependent variable (see table 3) - the normal
linear model might provide a reasonable approximation. Every regression equation was
estimated
13 under the different distributional assumptions imposed by the Poisson, negative
binomial maximum likelihood, and Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) count
models.
14 As for the regressors, one proxy each was inluded for the domestic macroeconomic
activity and the international influence via trade, as well as the growth rate of total industrial
production in Japan. The lagged dependent variable, NUMBERNEW(t-1), was eliminated
from a regression for redundancy reasons when insignificant. Combining each of the domestic
and international variables gives nine regression equations per specification. This procedure
serves three purposes. First, changing the control variables provides a sensitivity analysis of
the regression results for the different regressors. Second, changing specification further
analyses sensitivity, allowing for a comparison of the impact of each specification on the
regression results. Third, specification tests enable one to draw inferences on the nature of the
data generating process. Descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in table 4.
The regression results for the Poisson, the negative binomial, and the Poisson QML
specification of each of the nine equations are given in tables A1, A2 and A3, respectively in
                                               
13 The analysis was conducted using the computer package Econometric Views 3.1.
14 The Poisson regression model is the simplest count data model and can be considered as the benchmark
model. However, if its assumptions are violated, estimation with this model  cannot be efficient, and use
of the Poisson standard errors would lead to biased inference. Therefore, we estimated each regression
with these three specifications and conducted various tests in order to eliminate the appropriate
specification for each regression. Details for why we used the specifications mentioned above, and the
specification analysis itself are presented in Appendix A.11
appendix A. It is noted here that a remarkable robustness of the regression results is found
across the specifications with signs being identical in all cases but one, and the level of
significance only differing for IPJAPGR(t-1) and NUMBERNEW(t-1).







20 1 5.56 5.56
21 1 5.56 11.11
24 1 5.56 16.67
25 1 5.56 22.22
27 1 5.56 27.78
29 1 5.56 33.33
33 1 5.56 38.89
36 1 5.56 44.44
38 1 5.56 50.00
39 2 11.11 61.11
40 1 5.56 66.67
43 2 11.11 77.78
45 1 5.56 83.33
48 1 5.56 88.89
49 1 5.56 94.44
58 1 5.56 100.00
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
NUMBERNEW 35.89 10.59 20 58
GDPGR 2.13 1.19 -0.50 4.19
IPGR 1.67 2.45 -3.36 4.99
UER 0.24 0.79 -0.93 1.59
REER 0.90 0.08 0.79 1.10
TB 35.67 57.48 -45.10 131.80
IMPPEN 2.61 2.55 -2.73 6.19
IPJAPGR 2.04 4.27 -6.60 9.35
3. Regression Results
For ease of exposition, table 5 displays the regressions used for inference resulting from the
specification analysis. As a general indicator of the goodness of fit of the model, the Wald or12
likelihood ratio tests
15 of the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of all included explanatory
variables except the constant term strongly reject H0 at the 1 % or 5 % (2.5 % in these cases)
level of significance for all equations; i.e. the variation in the regressors explains to a
significant degree the variation in the dependent variable.
                                               
15  The likelihood ratio statistic is not valid for the Poisson QML model. Therefore, for the corresponding
equations (1-4 in table 5) the Wald statistic was calculated using the computer package Gauss, for
conducting a Wald test of the same null hypothesis. Recognizing that the coefficient vector is
asymptotically normally distributed so that its square product with the inverse of the variance
covariance matrix is ￿
2-distributed, the Wald statistic can be calculated. While the LR and the Wald
test statistic are asymptotically equivalent, they can lead to different results for small samples, where the
Wald test has a higher probability of rejection under the null hypothesis. However, in our case the Wald
statistics reject H0 with a high significance level. (For a detailed discussion see Berndt and Savin (1977)
and Evans and Savin (1982)).13
Table 5: Dominating Specifications used for Inference












(0.502751) (0.061057) (0.528063) (0.020914)
(2) 3.872307
*** -0.186479
*** -0.000238 0.036919 10.650348
** 3 3
(0.073671) (0.071714) (0.000783) (0.024793)
(3) -0.100371
*** -0.170957 0.040598 10.184560
** 3 5
(0.564083) (0.032795) (0.631012) (0.022833)
(4) -0.100580
*** 7.52E-05 0.041381 9.6566531
** 3 3


















(0.136863) (0.078711) (0.000715) (0.015289) (0.004003)
(7) 3.807706
*** -0.105191 -0.044178 0.034090
** -63.99732 22.19954
*** 3 3
(0.086326) (0.070650) (0.028051) (0.014841)
(8) 3.671735
*** -0.054780 -0.043790 0.035090
** -63.96534 22.26350
*** 3 3







(0.138702) (0.129786) (0.032825) (0.014595) (0.004608)
Notes:
Equations (1)-(4) are taken from table A3 (Poisson QML), equations (5)-(9) are taken from table A1 (Poisson) in appendix A.
Standard errors (for Poisson) or Huber-White robust standard errors (for Poisson QML) in parentheses.
*, 
**, 
*** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level of significance respectively, using a two-tailed test.
a Likelihood ratio test statistic (for regressions 5-9) or Wald test statistic (for regressions 1-4) of H0 : joint insignificance of all regressors except the constant against
H1 : joint significance. Asteriks indicate rejection of H0. LR and W are asymptotically ￿
2-distributed with q degrees of freedom, where q = number of restrictions.
b Degrees of freedom.
c Number of iterations completed for convergence.
Autocorrelation of the residuals was tested for up to the twelfth lag with the Ljung-Box-Q-statistic of H0 : residuals are serially uncorrelated. In none of the regressions could H0
be rejeced.14
The regression results indicate that during the period 1980-98 the filing rate of antidumping
and antisubsidy cases in the European Union was positively related to macroeconomic
pressure. Looking at the individual variables, there is strong evidence for the hypothesis that
pressures for antidumping protection in the EU are inversely related to the domestic
macroeconomic situation. Equations 1 to 6 show high significance with the expected negative
sign of the growth rate of real GDP (GDPGR(t-1)) and of total industrial production (IPGR(t-
1)), and with the expected positive sign of the unemployment rate (percentage change from
previous period, UER(t-1)). Thus, our results indicate that over the period under investigation,
the more AD-investigations were initiated the lower was the growth of real GDP or of total
industrial production, or the higher were the rates of unemployment. This suggests that in case
of a macroeconomic downturn either industries file more petitions and/or the European CP-
authority is more lenient in accepting requests for investigations.
Regarding external pressures approximated by the international trade position, we find strong
insignificance of all three proxies. Thus our results do not indicate that a real (effective)
appreciation of the EU countries‘ currencies implies a higher number of cases launched. Also,
the insignificance of both the real effective exchange rate and the trade balance in particular
suggest that the AD mechanism is not used for balance of payments reasons. Including import
penetration (percentage change from previous period, IMPPEN(t-1)) leads to insignificance of
the domestic macroeconomic variables, too, or, in the case of UER(t-1), strongly reduces the
level of significance. This is, however, no evidence for a lack of robustness of the significance
of the domestic macroeconomic variables but rather due to the high correlation of IMPPEN
with GDPGR, IPGR and UER (0.81, 0.82, and –0.83, respectively), which inflates the
standard errors of the collinear variables and thus reduces significance. Accordingly,
likelihood ratio tests of the joint insignificance of IMPPEN(t-1) and each of the domestic
macroeconomic proxies strongly rejected H0 at the 1 % level of significance. The signs of the
correlations suggest that at the aggregate level, import penetration might rather serve as an
alternative proxy for macroeconomic activity. Comparing the impact of the domestic
macroeconomic conditions and that of the international competitive factors on protectionist
pressures, we can conclude that our evidence suggests a much more important impact of the
former than of the latter.15
Turning to the growth rate of industrial production in Japan, the results indicate quite a robust
positive significance. Insignificance in equations 2 and 4 is likely due to multicollinearity
introduced in the equations by IPJAPGR(t-1) and TB(t-1) (the correlation coefficient is 0.61).
Deleting TB(t-1) from the regression leads to significance of IPJAPGR(t-1) at the 10 %
level.
16 A likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of the two
variables in equations 2 and 4 highly rejected H0 at the 5 % level of significance. The sign of
IPJAPGR(t-1) is, however, contrary to what was expected. The positive sign might indicate
that despite the inverse correlation of the growth rate of total industrial production and the
volume of total exports, there may be a positive relation to the share of exports to the
European Union. This could be the case if exports to the EU were mainly in goods with a low
price elasticity of demand in Japan, so that a fall in IPJAPGR(t-1) would not necessarily result
in a surge of these exports. However, this reasoning is contradicted by the positive sign of the
correlation of IPJAPGR and TB.
17 As it stands, the sign is rather puzzling, and this may be an
interesting issue for further research, also on the sectoral level.
The sign of the lagged number of newly initialized antidumping investigations,
NUMBERNEW(t-1), suggests, when significant, existence of the ‚depletion effect‘ Leidy
(1997) finds for the US. However, the significance is not robust to changes in the explanatory
variables.
Finally, our regressions do not support the view that changes in the European trade defensive
policy regulations agreed on in the Uruguay Round have exerted a significant change in the
course of contingent protection policy in the EU as the coefficient of the included Uruguay
Round dummy was insignificant
18 in all equations.
19
                                               
16 Deleting IPJAPGR(t-1), however, leaves TB(t-1) insignificant suggesting that the insignificance of
TB(t-1) is not due to the correlation.
17 Also, this reasoning implies an effect of IPJAPGR(t-1) via the trade balance which, however, is found
to be insignificant.
18  Due to their insignificance the regression results are not reported but available on request. The dummy
variable was added to the regressions displayed in table 5.
19 Of course, however, tests for structural change in regressions with a low number of observations should
be interpreted even more carefully than the regressions themselves, so it would be interesting to repeat
this exercise in some years time when more observations will be available.16
IV. Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to investigate the impact of the macroeconomic conditions on
the pressure for contingent protection in the European Union. Similar to previous studies for
the United States, we distinguished between domestic and external pressures. Our main
results indicate that the domestic macroeconomic situation is strongly inversely related to
pressures for contingent protection approximated by the number of newly initiated
antidumping and antisubsidy cases. This result is robust to changes in the proxies for the
macroeconomic pressure. However, with respect to external pressures all proxies were found
to be insignificant. We also attempted to test for potential effects of the legislative changes
implemented in 1995 after the Uruguay Round agreements. Our results suggest that (so far)
there has been no significant change in the course of contingent protection policy in the EU as
a result of these decisions. However, the investigation period 1980-98 only covers 18 annual
observations so it may be worth repeating the exercise in a couple of years when more
observations are available.
The regression results are remarkably robust to changes in the underlying model specification.
Different count data model specifications were employed in order to account for the discrete
and non-negative nature of the dependent variable, and various tests were conducted to derive
the appropriate specification for each of the estimated equations.
Concluding, similar to evidence for the United States, the presented estimations indicate a
strong impact of the domestic macroeconomic situation on the pressure for contingent
protection in the European Union. External factors do, however, not seem to play a major
role.19
Table A1: Specification Tests



















(5) 0.019592 0.014386 2.22294
(0.012706) (0.010902)
(6) 0.018956 0.014743 2.28930
(0.012380) (0.011123)
(7) 0.005243 0.014108 2.34924
(0.009658) (0.011130)
(8) 0.006438 0.014066 2.32510
(0.009412) (0.010443)
(9) 0.013717 0.012721 1.78714
(0.011700) (0.010463)
Notes:




*** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level of significance respectively, using a two-tailed test.
a, 
b Cameron and Trivedi as well as Wooldridge test of the Poisson hypothesis of mean-variance-equality
(H0). For a description, see footnote x. Asteriks indicate rejection of H0.
c Likelihood ratio test statistic of H0 : Poisson model against H1 : negative binomial maximum likelihood
model.
Asteriks indicate rejection of H0. LR is asymptotically ￿
2-distributed with q degrees of freedom, where
q = number of restrictions (here, q = 1 for all 9 tests).
Tables A1, A2 and A3 display the regression results of the Poisson, the negative binomial
maximum likelihood, and the Poisson QML models, respectively.20
Table A2: Poisson Regression Results
















































(0.136863) (0.078711) (0.000715) (0.015289) (0.004003)
(7) 3.807706
*** -0.105191 -0.044178 0.034090
** -63.99732 22.19954
*** 3 3
(0.086326) (0.070650) (0.028051) (0.014841)
(8) 3.671735
*** -0.054780 -0.043790 0.035090
** -63.96534 22.26350
*** 3 3







(0.138702) (0.129786) (0.032825) (0.014595) (0.004608)
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, 
**, 
*** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level of significance respectively, using a two-tailed test.
a Likelihood ratio test statistic of H0 : joint insignificance of all regressors except the constant against H1 : joint significance. Asteriks indicate rejection of H0. LR is
asymptotically ￿
2-distributed with q degrees of freedom, where q = number of restrictions.
b Degrees of freedom.
c Number of iterations completed for convergence.
Autocorrelation of the residuals was tested for up to the twelfth lag with the Ljung-Box-Q-statistic of H0 : residuals are serially uncorrelated. In none of the regressions could H0
be rejeced.21
Table A3: Negative Binomial Maximum Likelihood Regression Results

































































(0.177702) (0.100865) (0.000920) (0.020144) (0.005163) (0.902066)
(7) 3.803362






(0.114798) (0.091435) (0.036287) (0.019401) (0.889982)
(8) 3.667781






(0.073811) (0.046225) (0.036332) (0.019556) (0.893852)
(9) 3.834232







(0.175863) (0.164947) (0.041294) (0.018786) (0.005857) (0.986723)
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
*, 
**, 
*** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level of significance respectively, using a two-tailed test.
a Mixture parameter of the negative binomial model.
b Likelihood ratio test statistic of H0 : joint insignificance of all regressors except the constant against H1 : joint significance. Asteriks indicate rejection of H0. LR is
asymptotically ￿
2-distributed with q degrees of freedom, where q = number of restrictions.
c Degrees of freedom.
d Number of iterations completed for convergence.
Autocorrelation of the residuals was tested for up to the twelfth lag with the Ljung-Box-Q-statistic of H0 : residuals are serially uncorrelated. In none of the regressions could H0
be rejeced.22
Table A4: Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Regression Results










(0.502751) (0.061057) (0.528063) (0.020914)
(2) 3.872307
*** -0.186479
*** -0.000238 0.036919 10.65034
** 3 3




























(0.132887) (0.115522) (0.000751) (0.021574) (0.003979)
(7) 3.807706
*** -0.105191 -0.044178 0.034090
* 19.31654
*** 3 3
(0.083269) (0.090700) (0.031230) (0.017841)
(8) 3.671735
*** -0.054780 -0.043790 0.035090
* 17.35031
*** 3 3
(0.064812) (0.047151) (0.034433) (0.018849)
(9) 3.825411




(0.123996) (0.167753) (0.040993) (0.015635) (0.005179)
Notes:
Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses.
*, 
**, 
*** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level of significance respectively, using a two-tailed test.
a Wald test statistic of H0 : joint insignificance of all regressors except the constant against H1 : joint significance. Asteriks indicate rejection of H0.
W is asymptotically ￿
2-distributed with q degrees of freedom, where q = number of restrictions.
b Degrees of freedom = number of restrictions.
c Number of iterations completed for convergence.
Autocorrelation of the residuals was tested for up to the twelfth lag with the Ljung-Box-Q-statistic of H0 : residuals are serially uncorrelated. In none of the
regressions could H0 be rejected.23
Appendix B: Data
Data Sources
Commission of the European Community, Annual Reports of the Commission of the
European Communities on the Community’s Antidumping and Antisubsidy Activities
(1983-1998): data on the number of newly initiated antidumping and antisubsidy cases.
OECD Main Economic Indicators database: data on real GDP, imports of goods and
services (both in 1990 US-$), total industrial production for the EU and Japan, the real
effective exchange rate, and the consumer price index (all items) (all index numbers,
1995=100).
OECD Economic Outlook (June 1998 and 1999): data on the trade balance (in US-$, for the
analysis deflated to 1990 constant prices).
Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirschaftlichen Entwicklung
(Council of Economic Experts) (1999): data on total numbers of unemployed and employed
persons.24
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